



## Cartesianism vs. Empiricism: Johnson's Periodical Essays, and Sermons Through the Philosophy of John Locke

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### ABSTRACT

John Locke (1632-1704) was one of the prominent philosophers of the second half of the seventeenth century and a propagator of Empiricism. He supported the empirical view that one gains knowledge and experience throughout his lifetime, and in the meantime believed in the Cartesian view, also supported by the Libertarians, that humans are genuinely logical beings always succumbing to whatever their reason dictates, and there is no real difference between the human mind, rationality, and the will. For Locke, past gained experiences would assist the mind in pushing forward the will to the desired destination in life. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) was influenced by Locke's Cartesian view of the mind and became one of its followers, but deep inside he was also affected by the scientifically inspired ideological movements of his time and the philosophies stemming from them such as materialism led by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). These philosophers believed the effects and reverberations coming from past experiences affected one's will and pushed it in their appointed direction. Johnson, affected by both philosophies, developed an idea that although apparently free in its will, the mind is affected by invisible forces rooted deep in the psyche pushing it to their desired destination. The present article would aim at studying the correlation between these opposing philosophies, and their impact on the works and thoughts of Samuel Johnson through a study of his Periodical Essays and Sermons.

**Keywords:** Libertarian, Materialism, Psyche, Rationality.

### 1. Introduction

The seventeenth century was a pivoting point in the intellectual history of England. Renaissance infant, which was born in Italy in the Thirteenth Century, was reaching its maturity in that period replacing the ancient thoughts with novel scientifically based ideologies inaugurating what is now known as Modernity.

Renaissance saw the exhumation, and resurrection of the forgotten ancient sciences buried by The Church during the early years of the middle ages due to their antipathy to the ecclesiastical principles. The Church demonstrated zero tolerance for any alternative theories for example around the creation of the universe, and how it works except its interpretation and would label any different raised voice as heresy, and the individual advocating it as a heretic. It was also quite clear what would be awaiting someone labelled as a heretic. But as previously mentioned the developments in the seventeen century turned the tide towards more secular-scientific ideologies rather the traditional religious ones.

The seventeenth century also became the cradle for the birth and separation of new sciences from traditional Philosophy. In the first part of the century, exciting new scientific theories flourished and emerged only to get a strong foothold in the second half. But the old system of thought did not perish overnight.

There were still devotees to the old cherished principles inherited mostly from ancient Greek philosophers, like the Ptolemaic fixed universe belief which placed the Earth fixed in the middle and the other heavenly bodies rotating around it, the belief in the four elements which were believed to comprise all matter or the belief in the bodily humours which were supposed to determine human temperament. But this system based on conceptions was seriously questioned by scientists who based their studies on observation and experiment rather than the Cartesian system of logic, and intellectual predictions. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) pioneered a new system of scientific studies named Empiricism which was based on observation and experiment rather than the use of mere intellect and logic. Bacon is known as the father of empiricism, and all the scientific methods of study since his time have followed the principles established by Bacon. The discoveries based on Bacon's proposed methods seriously began questioning the older scientific doctrines. William Harvey's (1578-1658) discovery of the circulation of blood seriously questioned the older doctrine of assessing human temperament based on the theory of humours.

The telescope and the microscope were perhaps the greatest inventions of the seventeenth century. Galileo (1564-1642) used the telescope to observe the macrocosm and to approve the Copernican astronomical theories which downgraded Earth from its supposedly subtle position in the universe and turned it into an ordinary planet rotating around the Sun like all the other planets. Microscopes were also used to discover a microcosm universe of microscopic creatures unseen until that time.

These observations and scientific discoveries came to their ultimate peak through the works of Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1726), *The Principia* (1687), and *Opticks* (1704), and gave birth to what we know today as New Sciences. The introduction of the New Sciences also opened a new horizon for studying human nature from a novel perspective based on new principles, turning all the ancient theories on human nature null. New Sciences also opened the way for philosophers to question the old established philosophical doctrines as well, next to the scientific ones, and begin offering new theories concerning the origin of human conduct replacing the ancient ecclesiastically influenced Libertarian theories with scientifically stimulated Necessitarian ones.

Philosophers who came to prominence in the second half of the Seventeenth Century used the created atmosphere turning these religiously and scientifically rooted differences into a full-scale philosophical debate between Libertarians and Necessitarians. John Locke (1632-1704) was a proponent of Libertarianism in human conduct and believed humans were free to choose whether to take a certain action or refrain from taking that action and it all depend on their minds and will. Although a firm believer in Empiricism, Locke seems to be siding more with rationalists and Cartesians when he claims one's decisions are the result of his past gained knowledge and experiences in life. Ignoring the effects of the mentioned past experiences, he states that humans are rational beings who can make choices freely, and past experiences would assist decision-making making process. This argumentation was not welcomed by scientifically inspired philosophers like Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). For them, the mind had a more complex structure, and functioning process compared to the one described by Locke. They believed in the cause and effect principle and maintained that every human conduct is the effect of a previous cause originating from his past gained experiences. Therefore, if everything is considered to be happening on the cause-and-effect principle, then one has no control over his will, as all his present actions are an inescapable consequence of previous causes. These oppositional philosophies influenced the line of thought of Samuel Johnson. He believed in Libertarian principles but showed favour to Necessitarianism in the meantime deep inside which created a conflict within himself that can be traced in his works.

## 2. Literature Review

John Locke was one of the dominating philosophical figures of seventeenth-century England whose thoughts influenced the philosophical currents of the later centuries, and turned into the subject of a lot of commentary and criticism by later thinkers. He was one of the proponents of Empiricism, but his views towards the operation of the will and the mind were closer to the Cartesians.

John P. Wright in an article published in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century*, a book which provides a comprehensive picture of the philosophical sphere of that era, says "In the eighteenth century, Locke's conception of judgment was sometimes contrasted with that of the Cartesians, who held that judgment is a product of the will, and that the only operation of the understanding is to perceive" (Wright 114). Up to this moment he is echoing the general consensus about Locke, but then through some quotes and examples, he concludes that:

In fact, there seems to be little more than a verbal difference between the views of Locke and the Cartesians on the relation of the will to the understanding. Locke shared the Cartesian view that we are responsible for error, and that we should not assent to a proposition until the evidence in its favour is overwhelming (Wright 114)

A similar discussion can be found in *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century* in a chapter entitled 'John Locke on the Understanding' where the author explores Locke's views on the effect of passions on one's will.

In his mature view, Locke claims that the will is determined both by satisfaction of current action and by uneasiness. For simplicity's sake we shall focus on uneasiness. Locke describes this as working 'on the Mind to put it upon Action, which for shortness sake we will call *determining of the Will*' (*Essay* II. xxi. 29). Uneasiness is a passion; in fact, it is a form of pain. Uneasiness has an intentional object, such as a future state of affairs. It is this pain in view of future states of affairs that determines, that is, is the cause of, volitions. (Anstey 257)

So if the will is affected by passions, and determines our understanding. It can be deduced that passions determine our understanding. Thus he continues:

Now, given Locke's view that every case of liberty of action includes volition as a cause (*Essay* II. xxi. 8; Chappell 1994b:120), it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in spite of Locke's emphasis on the discreteness of the will and understanding, in those situations where the understanding suspends uneasiness, the will actively determines the understanding. (Anstey 258)

Both Handbooks provide useful information on the philosophical trends of Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century England. But further evidence of such discussions can also be found in the thirty-third chapter of *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-century Philosophy* entitled 'Determinism and Human Freedom' where after a lengthy discussion on Locke's concept of freedom of the will it is concluded that:

In general, when Locke says that *x* determines *y*, he means that *x* causes *y*. Since he holds that everything that happens in the world is the product of antecedent causes, he holds that everything, including every human action, is determined. In this he is in agreement with Hobbes and Spinoza (and indeed with Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz). But unlike these philosophers, Locke offers no defence of this doctrine of universal causation; indeed, he only rarely mentions it in the *Essay*. (Sleigh 1250)

James Harris in his book entitled *Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy* conducts thorough research on the nature and discussions around ideas of Free Will and Determinism among philosophers of the Eighteenth Century. After a lengthy discussion on how the ideas of Locke concerning free will and determinism were received by the philosophers of the Eighteenth-Century, he comes to a conclusion similar to that of Sleigh in the previous quote "Just as necessitarians like to believe that Locke was really a confused member of their party, so libertarians hold that Locke was, despite some unfortunate phraseology, one of them" (Harris 39). In fact, it becomes extremely difficult to label John Locke as a pure Cartesian, or Empiricist as in his writings he incorporates ideas of both philosophies, and this affected Johnson's ideas as well.

Questions might be raised at this stage on whether Johnson was affected by Locke's philosophy or not, and if affirmative to what extent. James McLaverty's article entitled *From Definition to Explanation: Locke's Influence on Johnson's Dictionary* has provided some answers.

There are some 3,241 acknowledged citations of Locke in the *Dictionary*, and although many of them pertain to Locke's writings on education rather than to his epistemology (he is the tutor of *Dictionary* as well as its philosopher), a significant number (at least 160) are directly concerned with language in relation to Locke's theory of Knowledge. Johnson's use of Locke to illustrate the signification of words is representative of his much larger debt: The *Dictionary* is deeply imbued with Locke's philosophy; it shapes the *Dictionary* as a whole and determines the concept of explanation which we are investigating. (McLaverty 384)

After learning the extent of the influence of Locke's philosophy on Johnson it would be beneficial to learn how Lockean Cartesian and Empirical views, or better to say libertarian and necessitarians views were received by Johnson.

James Boswell (1740-1795) wrote a comprehensive biography of Samuel Johnson entitled *The Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.* (1791). This book provides a rather accurate record of Johnson's life and quotes and sheds light on many aspects of Johnson's life. However though, only the aspects which are in the interest of the present research will be studied.

Johnson always introduced himself as one of the supporters of free will, but he was also aware of uncontrollable forces which could drive one's mind to their desired direction. This did not go unnoticed by Boswell. He expressed this mental confusion in Johnson as:

To Johnson, whose supreme enjoyment was the exercise of his reason, the disturbance or obscuration of that faculty was the evil most to be dreaded. Insanity, therefore, was the object of his most dismal apprehension; and he fancied himself seized by it, or approaching it, at the very time when he was giving proof of a more than ordinary soundness and vigour of judgment. (Boswell 14)

The concept of insanity vs. reason in Johnson, as characterized by Boswell, might be a very early reference to the uncontrollable powers of the mind that overpower reason from time to time in every human being.

Boswell was interested in raising the topic of free will and determinism with Johnson to learn his views on them, but Johnson avoided any lengthy discussion on the aforesaid topic whenever it was raised by Boswell. Boswell writes, "Dr Johnson shunned to-night any discussion of perplexed question of fate and free will, which I attempted to agitate. Sir (said he) we know our will is free, and there's an end on't" (*Boswell* 167). There are other similar instances

recorded by Boswell where Johnson avoids entering any discussions or reasoning on why he prefers free will to determinism. Boswell rooted the reason in Johnson's own uncertainty over this issue.

In another instance, while Boswell continued defending the Presbyterian faith in predetermination when he raised the topic of the Presbyterian faith, and the concept of predestination in it Johnson replied: "Why yes, Sir, predestination was a part of the clamour of the times, so it is mentioned in our articles, but with as little positiveness as could be." (Boswell 173)

To This Boswell replied: "It appears to me, Sir, that predestination, or what is equivalent to it, cannot be avoided, if we hold an universal prescience in the Deity" (Boswell 173)

Johnson who seemed not content with continuing this conversation replied: "Why Sir, does not God every day see things going on without preventing them?" (Boswell 173)

Boswell who seemed more excited than ever to continue this heated conversation replied:

True, Sir; but if a thing be certainly foreseen, it must be fixed, and cannot happen otherwise; and if we apply this consideration to the human mind, there is no free will, nor do I see how prayer can be of any avail. (Boswell 173)

Certainly, Johnson did not like such discussions and avoided getting involved in any further talks over this matter. Boswell remembers this instance as "I did not press it further, when I perceived that he was displeased and shrunk from any abridgement of an attribute usually ascribed to the Divinity" (Boswell 173). Then Boswell continues to describe how he felt the conflict in Johnson despite his obvious belief in free will "He was confined by a chain which early imagination and long habit made him think massy and strong, but which, had he ventured to try, he could at once have snapt him asunder" (Boswell 173). Boswell's analysis was somehow right. Johnson avoided the argument perhaps because deep in his heart he was not satisfied with the answers, and explanations he provided.

Boswell wrote in a letter to Johnson:

I wrote to him in February [1781], complaining of having been troubled by a recurrence of the perplexing question of liberty and necessity; and mentioning that I hoped soon to meet him again in London. (Boswell 465)

Johnson replied to the letter:

"DEAR SIR, I hoped you had got rid of all this hypocrisy of misery. What have you to do with Liberty and Necessity? Or what more than to hold your tongue about it? Do not doubt but I shall be most heartily glad to see you here again, for I love every part about you but your affliction with distress. (March 14, 1781)" (Boswell 465)

As mentioned by Boswell before, Johnson always tried to avoid entering any serious discussions concerning the ideas of Liberty and Necessity. In this letter too, he avoids the discussion and advises Boswell to clear his mind from any questions concerning these issues.

Another instance of Johnson being anxious of losing his faith in reason can be found in Hester Lynch Piozzi's (1741-1821) account of this dimension of Johnson's psyche in her account expressed in *Anecdotes of The Late Samuel Johnson, LLD.* (1786):

Mr. Johnson's health had been always extremely bad since I first know him, and his over-anxious care to retain without blemish the perfect sanity of mind contributed much to disturb it. He had studied medicine diligently in all its branches, but had given particular attention to the diseases of imagination which he watched in himself with a solicitude destructive of his own peace, and intolerable to those he trusted. (Delphi Classics 5995)

Adam Potkay in his book *The Passions for Happiness* believes Johnson was aware of the dominating role of passions in one's life and agreed with David Hume on this point despite his apparent disagreement with Hume's philosophy in general.

Several commentators on Johnson have recognized, in a general way, that the passions play a large and important role in Johnson's system of life, but they have all been more or less inconclusive as to what precisely that part is. I will contend that Johnson concurs, up to a point, with the analysis of the motivating passions adopted by Hume—who endeavoured to prove, against the fallacy "that reason combats the passions" first, that reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and secondly, that it can never oppose passions in the direction of the will. (Potkay 81).

*The invisible Riot of the mind* by Gloria Sybil Gross provides insight into the inner mental and psychological status of Johnson. In one instance she writes:

Evidently, Johnson's methodical, far ranging forays into the foundations of the psyche have an unmistakable affinity with Freud's. The principle of psychological determinism, the view of the mind as dictated by forces in conflict, the concept of dynamic unconscious and the submerged power of desire in all human activity, pervade the very texture of his writings. (Gross 4)

Elsewhere in the book Gross provides a vivid picture of the relationship between Locke and Johnson concerning the influence of the hidden mental forces on one's mind:

Although Locke, to be sure, gives little credence to the possibility of unconscious notion per se, he nonetheless prepares the way for such a principle. His question, 'Can another man perceive, that I am conscious of anything, where I perceive it not myself?', (*An Essay Concerning Understanding*), p. 115 was soon answered in the affirmative by Johnson. Penetrating the mystique of hitherto to irreducible experience, Johnson avows the existence of a hidden mental domain. (Gross 31)

In Another instance of the book, she elaborates upon Johnson's periodical essays from a rather psychoanalytical point of view:

The periodical essays are pervaded by the subject of mental suffering and how it originates in various disguised and contradictory strands of experience. The 'tyranny' or 'dominion' of the mind, Johnson's salient idea, uncovers an arsenal of stratagems, opening through phobias, compulsive acts, inhibition, repression, and the like. He commonly traces this interior chain of command to crude and, for the most part, vaguely detachable sources, and he regards their deterministic function. (Gross 91)

In *The Achievement of Samuel Johnson* W.J. Bate also makes a reference to the affiliation of Johnson to Freud: In the work of Freud, the principal problem is not, of course, sex, but repression. Johnson's own sense of the working of the human imagination probably provides us with the closest anticipation of Freud to be found in psychology or moral writing before the twentieth century. (Bate 93)

The number and amount of produced literature on this topic certainly are not limited to the ones mentioned in this literature review, but the most notable ones have been mentioned here for the sake of brevity. The researcher, inspired by the previous arguments, has provided a new dimension to these studies by depicting the influence of the mentioned ideas on Johnson by performing a careful and close analysis of his periodical works and sermons. How this shift of thought from pure belief in free will to the admittance of the existence of uncontrollable mental forces affecting one's psyche gradually evolved and matured in Johnson through the years from his youth to his more mature age has also been studied by tracing his periodical works from their earliest to the latest issues.

### 3. Discussion

#### 3.1 John Locke

John Locke (b. 1632, d. 1704) was a British philosopher, Oxford academic and medical researcher, and one of the prominent philosophers of Europe during the second half of the seventeenth century. It is not an exaggeration to state that he was the most dominating philosophical figure, in other words, the intellectual ruler of the eighteenth century, and his ideas became a milestone for many other philosophers and literary figures who flourished during that era. Born in Wrington to Puritan parents of modest means, his father was a country lawyer who served in a cavalry company on the Puritan side in the early stages of the English Civil War. Locke grew up and lived through one of the most extraordinary centuries of English political and intellectual history. It was a century when conflicts between the Crown and Parliament and the overlapping conflicts between Protestants, Anglicans and Catholics ended up in the Glorious Revolution. The changes following that revolution affected Locke in developing his moral, philosophical, and political theories.

Affected by the various events during his lifetime his works further developed empiricism, and rationalism simultaneously becoming the basis for Enlightenment and Liberalism. Locke became the representative of the eighteenth-century intellectual movement. His theories in *Two Treatises of Government* (1689) became the basis for political systems and government establishments that flourished in later centuries. He is also famous for calling for the separation of Church and State in his *A Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689). *He became the intellectual father of all democratic, and liberal political systems we see today.*

Locke wrote numerous books during his lifetime, but he is best known for *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* which for the sake of brevity will be named *The Essay*. It was first published in 1690, appeared in four-lifetime editions and was translated into French and Latin before Locke's death in 1704. In this work, he discusses the foundations of human knowledge and understanding from a neoclassical viewpoint. It is one of the first defences of modern empiricism and engages itself in determining the limits of human understanding around a wide variety of topics. He, like other contemporary philosophers of his age, supported the empiricist view that all knowledge has its origin in human observation and experience.

*The Essay* is also important for its twenty-first chapter entitled *Of Power*, which is the longest chapter in the book, dealing with the question of Liberty in human conduct.

Locke begins the chapter with a definition of the concept of will and its associated terms. Thus he defines will as:

This *power* which the mind has, thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and *vice versa* in any particular instance, is that which we call the *will*. (Locke 222) (italics by the original author)

Next, he defines volition or willing as "The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance is that which we call *volition* or *willing*" (Locke 222). Next, he defines voluntary and involuntary actions

as “The forbearance of that action, consequent of such order of command of the mind, is called *voluntary*. And whatever action is performed without such thought of the mind, is called *involuntary*” (Locke 222)

### 3.2 Hobbes vs Locke

Locke, unlike Hobbes who is presented here as one of the pioneers of Scientifically-materialistically inspired philosophers, finds the will as a faculty of the mind, and not the soul “the understanding and the will are two faculties of the mind” (Locke 222). Because our mind is the centre for logic and reason, our will, Locke says, is the reasonable commander of the soul. He associates the soul with “inferior faculties” which is a reference to the passions.

For when we say, the *will* is the commanding and superior faculty of the soul; that is, or is not free; that it determines the inferior faculties; that it follows the dictates of *understanding* etc. (Locke 222)

As mentioned in the previous paragraph here rises the main difference between Locke and Hobbes concerning their understanding of the faculty of will. Hobbes as a Necessitarian believed people can choose to act or not but are unable to control their will and decide whether to will or not, and for him, our will is necessitated by outside forces and factors. Locke on the opposite side, as a Libertarian, believes one has complete control over his will and can choose whether to act or forbear from acting, and the concepts of liberty and necessity arise from this ability of man which Locke attributes to the higher abilities of our minds compared to inferior faculties of our souls. Unlike Hobbes, Locke did not find one’s past experiences effective in his decision-making process.

Everyone, I think, finds in himself a *power* to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himself. From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of *liberty* and *necessity*. (Locke 223)

Then he defines the conditions when a man is free concerning the choices he has in his actions: “.... So far as a man has the power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his mind, so far is a man *free*” (Locke 233)

Again here Locke emphasizes the freedom of man in his choices according to the decision of his will, which is in contrast with Hobbes’s philosophy.

As previously mentioned Hobbes’s philosophy which supports Necessitarianism stood on the opposite side of that of Locke. Hobbes’s theory is first introduced in *Leviathan* (1651). In chapter six of the book, he discusses kinds of the mechanical theory of movement and divides the movements into two categories of unhindered free movement, and movements caused by antecedents. For example, Hobbes considers water running down a hill, the natural movements of animals and also humans as free actions as long as they are not impeded by their movements “Liberty, or Freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of opposition.... And may be applied no less irrational, and Inanimate creatures than to rational” (*Leviathan* 261). This category of movement which Hobbes classifies as involuntarily includes blood circulation, blinking of the eyes, or breathing. Hobbes’s argument around Liberty and Necessity is further developed when he begins discussing voluntary actions. When it comes to voluntary actions our minds are still affected by previous events; therefore, our present voluntary actions cannot be considered free as they are the effects of our previous thoughts and experiences. So for Hobbes, a free action is defined as an action without any previous causes or antecedents. As there is no action without any precedence, Hobbes’s freedom of the will for voluntary actions becomes meaningless.

Another point of difference between Locke and Hobbes is their view on the subject of passions. Locke accepted the existence of passions which might affect the will temporarily, but he took the passions for granted and found the mind as the soul commander of the will rational enough not to be seriously affected by any passions. Hobbes, on the other hand, found the passions as the only leader of one’s will, and reason as a mere consultant to the passions lacking the ability to stop someone from following his passions instead of reason. The influence of these philosophies can be observed in many of Johnson’s works, but the observation in the present article will be limited to his periodical essays and Sermons.

### 3.3 Johnson and his Periodical Essays

#### 3.3.1 Rambler Essays

Samuel Johnson wrote 200 essays for a twice-weekly periodical named *The Rambler* from 1750 to 1752. He touched upon many issues in his essays from biography to moral subjects and literary criticism, but only the discussions related to the topics of interest of the present study will be dealt with here.

Returning to the discussion on reason and passions as representatives of Cartesian Rationalism and scientific Empiricism, Johnson in some instances in his essays sides with Locke when he regards the mind, reason as the sole commander of one’s will, and passions as temporary disturbances to the peaceful flow of one’s intellectual spring. In *Rambler* Number two he concludes that writers who seek fame, pleasure or riches are ‘prepossessed by passions’, and this immersion in pleasures would disturb the right thinking.

In *Rambler* Number Five he also shows his commitment to Locke by stressing the idea of the reason being the sole ruler of the mind, but passions to be thought about as an instrument for amusement: “The mind should be kept

open to the access of every new idea, and so far disengaged from the predominance of particular thought, as easily to accommodate itself to occasional entertainment" (Delphi Classics 214). Johnson stresses the fact that no matter how strong one's desires are, they have to and can be controlled by reason. Thus in Rambler No. Seven, he writes: "Nor will greatness, or abundance, exempt him from the importunities of the desire, since, if he is born to think, he cannot restrain himself from a thousand inquiries and speculations, which he must pursue by his own reason" (Delphi Classics 222). In Rambler Number 8 he writes: "All action has its origin in the mind, and that therefore to suffer the thought to be vitiated, is to poison the fountains of morality: Irregular desires will produce licentious practices;" (Bate 23). These remarks show Johnson's conviction for everyone's possession of liberty that can be directed by every mature mind.

In Rambler Number Nine, Johnson raises the issue of controlling excitement when encountering a successful job: "This passion for the honour of a profession, like that for the grandeur of our own country, is to be regulated not extinguished" (Bate 31).

Thus he continues as:

Everyman, from the highest to the lowest station, ought to warm his heart, and animate his endeavours with the hopes of being useful to the world, by advancing the art which it is his lot to exercise, and for that end he must necessarily consider the whole extent of its application, and the whole weight of its importance (Bate 31)

So for Johnson passions do exist, but should be controlled and tamed by reason, and should also be used for moral purposes. But we can see that later on Johnson confesses that this is not always true and possible.

In other instances, like Rambler Number Fourteen, Johnson defends the righteousness of one's reason, and mind by showing the way through one's lifetime. He stresses the existence of passions, but in the meantime stresses also the fact that they can be governed, and that one should have the ability to subdue them to his will.

This overview of Johnson's Rambler initial essays reveals his firm belief in the dominance of reason over the passions in the human psyche. But as will be demonstrated later on he gradually changes sides in later essays and begins offering different opinions which can be linked to his internal conflicts on the subject of liberty and necessity.

Johnson writes about the role of 'chance' in one's life in Rambler Nineteen. Here for the first time perhaps he confesses that reason can lose grip of the situation when external or internal pressures mount to an uncontrollable level. He brings the example of Bishop Sanderson (1587-1663) that while preparing his lectures he was so tormented by his doubts and internal conflicts that he was forced to prepare not the best lectures, but whatever came to his mind through chance:

.... The complication is so intricate, the motives and objections so numerous, there is so much play for the imagination, and so much remains in the power of others, that reason is forced at last to rest in neutrality, the decision devolves into the hands of chance. (Delphi Classics 285)

In this particular instance on 'chance' Johnson introduces a kind of 'conditioned determinism'. Under some conditions, one's reason is unable to lead the mind anymore and leaves everything to chance, and leaving things to chance means one succumbing to what the future has determined for him.

In Rambler Twenty-One Johnson makes reference to a phenomenon very similar to the ruling passion<sup>1</sup> introduced by Alexander Pope (1688-1744) in his *Essay on Man* (1733). He writes:

Every man is prompted by the love of himself to imagine, that he possesses some qualities, superior, either in kind or in degree, to those which he sees attached to the rest of the world; and, whatever apparent disadvantages he may suffer in the comparison with others, he has some invisible distinctions, some latest reverse of excellence, which he throws onto the balance, and which he generally fancies that it is turned in his favour. (Delphi Classics 290)

This can be interpreted as the dominance of a certain type of passion in every individual. The reason could be the fact that rarely anyone would complain of the type the passions with which he is possessed as that comprises the maximum portion of his psyche and his whole identity.

Johnson, however, after his excesses in Ramblers Nineteen and Twenty-One in admitting the dominance of certain passions in everyone, and the conditioned determinism mends his speech in Rambler Twenty-Nine, he rejects hard determinism<sup>2</sup> by arguing that one should do whatever in his capabilities to avoid leaving everything to chance and that resigning to mere chance is below human dignity. "An idle and thoughtless resignation to chance, without any struggle against calamity, or endeavour after advantage, is indeed below the dignity of a reasonable being" (Delphi Classics 326)

In Rambler Number Thirty-One Johnson introduces factors which might disturb the smooth flow of reason in one's mind:

Let every man, who finds vanity so far predominant, as to betray him to the danger of this last degree of corruption, pause a moment to consider what will be the consequence of the plea which he is about to offer for a practice to which he knows himself not led by reason, but impelled by the violence of desire, surprised by the suddenness of passion, or seduced by the soft approaches of temptation.... (Bate 78)

The 'suddenness of passion' Johnson refers to might be an introduction to the notion named as 'invisible riot of the mind' introduced in Rambler Number Eighty-Nine. These remarks by Johnson show his gradual turn from relying on reason as the sole commander of the soul to finding reason influenced by different passions and other psychic forces. It may show his gradual turning from Cartesianism to Empiricism or Locke to Hobbes.

This push-and-pull strategy of Johnson continues in Rambler Number Forty-One. Johnson does not wish to give any value other than the base, temporary, and unimportant impulsive reactions to human instincts. Thus he describes the difference between instinct and reason:

... That the idea of one was impressed at once, and continued through all the progressive descents of species, without variation or improvement; and that the other is the result of experiments compared with experiments, has grown, by accumulated observation, from less greater excellence, and exhibits the collective knowledge of different ages, and various professions.... (Bate 88)

He resists the notion of prioritizing or mentioning the importance and influence of instincts in human life. Something which may stem from his scholastic, and religious upbringing, but as we shall see later on this attitude of his would change as the essays progress in numbers.

Johnson devalues the origin, and role of the instincts in people in Rambler Number Forty-One. But he demonstrates a rather different view in Rambler Number Forty-Nine: "The first motives of human actions are those appetites which providence has given to man, in common with the rest of the inhabitants of the earth.... The next call that rouses us from a state of inactivity, is that of our passions...." (Bate 104) Here Johnson reconsiders the role of instincts in human existence by blowing a celestial breath into it. Instincts are base habits, but when the same habits are mingled with the Providence they become valuable and so important as to attribute every first motive to them.

Next Johnson turns his attention to Alexander Pope and his introduced doctrine of the ruling passion. In Rambler 43 Johnson writes of people "that imagine themselves to have endeavoured to persuade us that each man is born with a mind formed peculiarly for certain purposes" (Delphi Classics 385). It is a clear reference to Pope and his idea of the ruling passion. Later on, in this very issue, Johnson rejects Pope's claim on the ruling passion. "This position has not indeed, been hitherto proved with strength proportionate to the assurance with which it has been advanced, and perhaps will never gain much prevalence by a close examination".(Delphi Classics 385)

While Johnson rejects Pope's doctrine of the ruling passion, he argues that humans in every stage of their lives are dominated by a particular passion, and crave to fulfil it. "Yet as every step in the progression of existence changes our position with respect to the things about us, so as to lay us open to new assaults and particular dangers and subject us to inconveniences from which any other situation is exempt". (Rambler 43) 'Progression of existence' is a reference to one's advancement in age and Johnson believed, as he has also mentioned in other essays<sup>3</sup>, everyone is dominated by certain passions throughout the different periods of his life. For example, the youth with romantic passions, and adults with passions for wealth and fame. Here, an argument may rise that while Johnson rejects the notion of an innate ruling passion, he admits the dominance of every stage of human life with a certain passion, or passions that would undoubtedly dominate one's will. Such arguments by Johnson may reveal the internal conflict lurking deep within him from time to time. He believed in the dominance of passions deep within his soul and the consequent determinism flowing from it, but could not bring himself to admit it publically due to his emotional commitment to Cartesianism. Perhaps that is why he introduced the 'invisible riot of the mind' in Rambler Eighty-Nine.

Rambler Eighty-Nine is entitled 'The Luxury of Vain Imagination'. In this Essay, Johnson argues man is commanded by his reason while he is doing his public life and running his ordinary affairs, however, the circumstances change when he is alone. As soon as he is alone and retires to his mental den and lair a strange force which Johnson names 'invisible riot of the mind' takes control of his psyche. He defines the riotous mind as:

But this invisible riot of the mind, this secret prodigality of being, is secure from detection, and fearless of reproach. The dreamer retires to his apartments, shuts out the cares and interruptions of mankind, and abandons himself to his own fancy; new worlds rise up before him, one image is followed by another, and a long succession of delights dances round him. (Delphi Classics 583)

Here Johnson seems to side more with materialistic philosophers such as Hobbes in his claim on the existence of invisible powers which take control of the psyche, take control of the will, and subdue the reasoning faculty.

In the previous paragraph, the relationship between Hobbes and Johnson was discussed regarding the invisible powers which take control of the psyche. W.J. Bate in his book *The Achievement of Samuel Johnson* expresses a different view on this issue. First, he praises Johnson for brushing aside all the discussions going around the issues concerning Liberty, and Necessity and focusing his attention on the core of the matter. Then he continues:

It is, in fact, this clear eyed ability to brush aside the clatter of labels, and to seize on the actual process of desiring itself that enables Johnson's moral thought to avoid the egocentric determinism of Thomas Hobbes and of moralists or psychologists who have repeated or refined on Hobbes for the past three centuries (Bate 68)

Here Bate argues Johnson has a more logical view of Hobbes, and his argument is streaming from reason which is of course very typical of the line of thought in the eighteenth century. And he continues as:

Johnson does not, like Shaftsbury, Rousseau, or other romantics simply deny Hobbes's argument that man is basically selfish. Instead, he takes them for granted. Where Johnson differed from Hobbes is in supplementing these arguments with other considerations which Hobbes overlooks or disregards. He does this especially by recurring always to the nature of desire itself, as an activity inherent in a living creature whose motions are gradual. (Bate 68)

Bate further argues that Johnson did not disagree with Hobbes on his Necessitarian views, but tried to disregard them as if Hobbes did not exist, or had not uttered any ideas ever. He describes how Johnson did it but does not give any reason for it. The reason might lie in the fact that Johnson was well aware of the uncontrollable powers lurking in one's psyche, which is called the unconscious nowadays, but admitting them would deepen his already rising conflict on who is the victor in the constant battle over the will, the conscious side which he named reason or the unconscious one which he named passions.

This interest of Johnson in the unconscious has caught the eye of critics. James Engell, a professor of English and Comparative literature writes:

Johnson probes the unconscious mind...with a brilliant, stubborn persistence unrivalled before Freud. He is aware that the door is always open between imagination and every impulse, instinct, and emotion, at every level from the rudimentary to the sophisticated. This leads to a less compartmentalised, more dynamic conception of the mind than is common among contemporary writing in the 1750s. (Engell 61)

Paul K. Alkon comments on the same subject "In recognizing the existence of unconscious motivation as well as in pointing out the importance of our disposition to forget whatever makes us uncomfortable, Johnson anticipates two major concerns of Freudian psychology" (Alkon 138)

Earlier in this article, we learned about Johnson's first opinion on the concept of chance in Rambler Nineteen. As discussed before it seems as if Johnson turns from Lockean libertarianism to Hobbesian necessitarianism as the Essays progress in numbers. In Rambler Fifty-six he criticizes those who ignore the role of chance in their lives: "I have therefore frequently looked with wonder, and now and then with pity, at the thoughtlessness with which some alienate from themselves the affections of all whom chance, business, or inclination, brings in their way". (Delphi Classics 442) Then he tries to find the true motives behind one's actions:

... When we see a man pursuing, some darling interest, without much regard to the opinion of the world, we justly consider him as corrupt and dangerous, but are not long in discovering his motives; we see him actuated with passions which are hard to be resisted, and deluded by appearances which have dazzled stronger eyes. (Delphi Classics 442)

So the Machiavellian pursuit of one's goals apparently might seem ugly to the world, but for Johnson what lies beneath the apparent motives seems to be more interesting which is the dominance of irresistible passions in charging, and directing one's motives toward a certain goal. As can be seen, Johnson does not consider any role for reason in this situation.

In Rambler One Hundred and Three, however, Johnson shows a different view from the one just expressed concerning passions. Here he reduces passions to a 'temporary' state rather than being dominant, tyrannical and irresistible. He argues men should always pursue higher goals in life but are sometimes hindered by some short-lived winds:

This negligence is sometimes only the temporary effect of a predominant passion: a lover finds no inclination to travel any path, but that which leads to the habitation of his mistress; a trader can spare little attention to common occurrences, when his fortune is endangered by a storm. (Delphi Classics 652)

The 'negligence' Johnson refers to is the lack of pursuit of virtue and other higher values which should be considered as the ultimate goal in life. The reason is the existence of a 'predominant passion' in every age. Johnson brings forth the examples of the lover and the trader but certainly, there will be other predominant passions in other stages of life too. So as discussed before, although he rejects Pope's ruling passion in the earlier essays, he introduces a sort of ruling passion for every stage of life.

In Ramblers One Hundred and Twenty-Six, and Seven Johnson gives a new twist to the concept of passions. In Rambler One Hundred and Twenty-Six he finds a certain kind of passion assisting reason in its goals rather than disturbing it:

Fear is a passion which every man feels so frequently predominant in his own breast, that he is unwilling to hear it censured with great asperity.... Fear is implanted in us as a preservative from evil; but its duty, like other passions, is not to overbear reason, but assist it.... (Delphi Classics 757)

Of course, Johnson does not elaborate further on the 'other passions' which assist reason, and only finds fear assisting it. He also fails to describe how fear exactly assists reason, while the other 'violent passions' as he names them in Rambler One Hundred and Twenty-Seven destroy one's life:

It is not uncommon for those who, at their first entrance into the world were distinguished for attainments or abilities, to disappoint the hopes which they had raised, and to end in neglect and obscurity that life

which they began in celebrity and honour.... Some are indeed stopt at once in their career by a sudden shock of calamity, or diverted to a different direction by the cross impulse of some violent passion. (Delphi Classics 761-2)

Sometimes it becomes difficult to understand Johnson's concept of passions. In one instance they come to help reason to elevate one's soul toward the ultimate good and in another instance, a 'violent passion' like a gust of wind sends one's ship of life off course. And when this happens then man would leave everything to chance: "man, thus cut off from the prospect of that port to which his address and fortitude had been employed to steer him, often abandons himself to chance and to the wind...." (Delphi Classics 763)

As a final touch on the Rambler Essays, it is worth mentioning one of the last Ramblers which is Rambler Number One Hundred and Ninety-Six. There Johnson points out that no matter how strong someone's will might be, he will be affected and guided by his passions, and outside circumstances affecting him:

Whoever reviews the state of his own mind from the dawn of manhood to its decline, and considers what he pursued or dreaded, slighted or esteemed, at different periods of his age, will have no reason to imagine such changes of sentiment peculiar to any station or character. Everyman, however careless or inattentive, has conviction forced upon him; The lectures of time obtrude themselves upon the most unwilling or dissipated auditor; and, by comparing our minds, though perhaps we cannot discover when the alteration happened, or by what causes it was produced. (Delphi Classics 1050)

### 3.3.2 *The Adventurer Essays*

Johnson wrote a second series of periodical essays for a magazine called *The Adventurer* and contributed twenty-nine essays to the periodical within one year beginning on March 1753.

We saw in *Rambler Essays* that Johnson ascribed a 'predominant passion' to every age in life. In *Adventurer Number Sixty-Nine*, however, while he is discussing the nearness of death to us he goes one step further and claims everyone is dominated by a favourite activity, or 'fallacy' as he names it which prevents him from acting based on the dictates of his reason.

.... But this [the idea that death is near] is only one of the innumerable artifices practised in the universal conspiracy of mankind against themselves: every age and every condition indulges some darling fallacy; every man amuses himself with projects which he knows to be improbable. And which, therefore, he resolves to pursue without daring to examine them. (Delphi Classics 1152)

In *Adventurers Eighty-Five*, and *Ninety-Five* he quotes the great thinkers of his age. This certainly shows his interest in the new sciences despite his religious prejudices. In *Adventurer Eighty-Five* he quotes Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) famous saying "It is observed by Bacon, that 'reading makes a full man, conversation a ready man, and writing an exact man'" (Delphi Classics 1172). In *Adventurer Ninety-Five* he not only refers to the discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton (1643-1727) in optics but also links them to human passions:

It has been discovered by Sir Isaac Newton, that the distinct and primo genial colours are only seven; but every eye can witness, that from various mixtures, in various proportions, infinite diversifications of tints may be produced. In like manner, the passions, from whence arise the pleasures and pains that we see and hear of, if we analyse the mind of man, are very few; but those few agitated and combined, as external causes shall happen to operate, and modified by prevailing opinions and accidental caprices, make such frequent alterations on the surface of life, that the show, while we are busied in delicating it, vanishes from the view, and a new set of objects succeed, doomed to the same shortness of duration with the former.... (Delphi Classics 1187)

This resemblance of passions to the colours in the spectrum depicts the influence of the scientific fervour of that time on Johnson and the importance of the role of passions in one's life. It seems Johnson could not help admitting the dominance of Empiricism advocated by the New Sciences in one's life and destiny, besides admitting the importance of the undeniable scientific discoveries of his time.

Further to what was just discussed, Johnson admits that man is not the king of his future, and powers out of his control mark his destiny. In *Adventurer One Hundred and Twenty* he writes:

It has been the boast of some swelling moralists, that every man's fortune was in his power, that prudence supplied the place of all other divinities, and that happiness is the unfailing consequence of virtue. But, surely, the quiver of Omnipotence is stored with arrows, against which the shield of human virtue, however adamantine it has been boasted, is held up in vain: we do not always suffer by our crimes; we are not always protected by our innocence. (Delphi Classics 1222)

Here Johnson admits the fact that sometimes one's future is left in the hands of chance and destiny, and there is nothing the will can do in such circumstances. This is another instance of Johnson turning from Lockean Libertarianism which is based on Cartesian principles to more materialistic and Empirical ones.

### 3.3.3 *The Idler Essays*

The Idler was the last series of periodical essays Johnson wrote during his lifetime. It consists of one hundred and three essays published between 1758 and 1760 in the London Weekly the *Universal Chronicle*.

In Idler Number Two Johnson writes about the role of chance in people's lives: "He that embarks in the voyage of life, will always wish to advance rather by the impulse of the wind, than the stroke of the oar, and many founder in the passage, while they lie waiting for the gale that is to waft them their wish". (Delphi Classics 1258) Johnson here demonstrates one's inclination to rely on chance in his advancements rather than taking any toils for achieving any progress in life. With a close study of the Rambler Essays until The Idler which was published with an eight-year gap, it can be seen that Johnson's ideas have changed dramatically over the years. In the initial issues of the Rambler, he had a much more radical view towards life, the role of reason, and the negative role of chance, but it seems it has changed over the years. This might be the effect of either his advancement in age, and acquiring a more moderate temper and ideas about life, or the impact of the Empirically-scientifically loaded atmosphere around him.

As a final touch upon Johnson's periodical essays, it will be worth learning how he dealt with the subject which is now known as the 'unconscious'. In Idler Twenty-Seven he writes:

.... But, as very few can search deep into their minds without meeting what they wish to hide from themselves, scarcely any man persists in cultivating such disagreeable acquaintance, but draws the veil again between his eyes and his heart, leaves his passions and appetites as he found them, and advises others to look into themselves (Delphi Classics 1334)

Johnson had a feeling that people should 'look inside' their souls to search for the true passions and inclinations buried deep within their souls. Although when they look deep what they find might not be very agreeable. But people should not abandon this inner search and advise others to conduct the same search.

And the result of this search? Johnson explains in Idler Number Fifty-One "... Those notions which are to be collected by reason, in opposition to the senses, will seldom stand forward in the mind, but lie treasured in the remoter repositions of memory, to be found only when they are sought". (Delphi Classics 1406) So people are more inclined to give in to their passions and prioritize their senses rather than their reason on any first impulse.

### 3.4 *Sermons*

The last topic to be studied would be the Sermons of Johnson. Johnson wrote Sermons on a variety of moral issues such as marriage, repentance, hardening the heart, charity, pride, wisdom, and compassion. He either wrote the sermons to be preached by priests on their Sunday morning church services or to be preached on special occasions such as when he wrote a sermon on the occasion of his wife's funeral.

Johnson begins his argument on the materialistically based role of passions in one's life from the very first Sermon. In Sermon Number One after he argues that humans are rarely ignorant of what choices they make, and what they do he writes: "Men are not blindly betrayed into corruption, but abandon themselves to their passions with their eyes open; and lose the direction of truth, because they do not attend to her voice, not because they do not hear, or do not understand it". (Hagstrom 5) Of course, this view of the intentional falling of humans into the trap of passions is in contrast with the previously uttered notions of 'the invisible riot of the mind' and other issues which argued that humans succumb to their passions instinctively and unconsciously. The researcher believes this utterance of Johnson goes back to this writing being a sermon to be preached to a special audience, and certainly no preacher would have liked to label the congregation as born sinners.

In Sermon Number Four he offers the solution to the problem of intentionally succumbing to passions which are characterized by the fear of God:

In consequence of this general doctrine, the whole system of moral and religious duty is expressed in the language of Scripture, by the 'fear of God'. A good man is characterized, as a man that feareth God; and the fear of the Lord is said to be the beginning of wisdom; and the text affirms, that happy is the man that feareth always. (Hagstrom 30)

In the previous writings, Johnson always recognized reason, as a representative of the human ego, and as the only phenomenon powerful enough to suppress id-like passions. But here he alters his views and represents the superego like 'fear of God' as the sole controller of human uncontrolled passions.

Sermon Number Five could be viewed as one of those sermons where Johnson offers paradoxical views on Liberty and the role of Providence in the implementation of it among people.

First, he blames people for their sins and the fact that God has offered choices to choose between good and evil and if someone chooses to go to the path of evil then he is to be blamed and not the Providence.

Complaints are doubtless irrational in themselves; and unjust with respect to God, if the evils we lament are in our hands; for what more can be expected from the beneficence of our Creator, than that he should place good and evil before us, and then direct us in our choice. (Hagstrom 55)

Next Johnson elaborates on the omnipotence of Providence and the reason why sins are not prevented and fates not altered.

If God should, by a particular exertion of his omnipotence, hinder murder or oppression, no man could then be a murderer or an oppressor, because he would be with-held from it by an irresistible power; but then that power, which prevented crimes, would destroy virtue; for virtue is the consequence of choice. Men would be no longer rational, or would be rational to no purpose, because their actions would not be the result of free-will. Determined by moral motives; but the settled and predestined motions of a machine impelled by necessity. (Hagstrom 56)

Johnson further stresses this view:

Thus it appears, that God would not act as the Governour of rational and moral agents, if he should lay any other restraint upon them, than the hope of rewards, or fear of punishments; and that to destroy, or obviate the consequence of human actions, would be to destroy the present constitution of the world. (Hagstrom 57)

Up to this point Johnson has completely sided with the theologians on the necessity of a sort of 'theological determinism' that implies free will within itself. Humans are free in their choices and there is no interference by Providence. In these remarks, one cannot see any traces of Johnson's previously introduced notions of the unconscious mind, rationalistic interpretations, or the idea of the 'invisible riot of the mind'. As mentioned before this can be related to the nature of these writings as Sermons which were made to be preached in churches, and certainly one cannot expect a sermon to be pregnant with doubtful notions or contradictory ideas.

But soon in the same sermon, one can see traces of doubts in Johnson's words about the certainty of the previous remarks on the role of Providence in one's life. First, he begins with God's interference in preventing evil: "God may indeed, by special acts of providence, sometimes hinder the design of bad men from being successfully executed, or the execution of them from producing such consequences as it naturally tends to....". (Hagstrom 57) Of course, Johnson is very cautious while uttering these words, and certainly has considerations in mind both for himself as not to openly contradict his previous remarks, and also not to upset the clergymen who are going to preach his sermons, so he continues "... But this, whenever it is done, is a real, though not always a visible miracle, and not to be expected in the ordinary occurrences of life, or the common transactions of the world" (Sermons 57) So, on one hand, Johnson accepts that God interferes with worldly affairs from time to time, but on the other hand, he takes caution not to generalize it to all affairs. He also makes use of ambiguous expressions such as 'special acts of Providence'. Or 'ordinary occurrences of life' for which he neither provides any clear explanation of their nature nor any certain definition or example of what these expressions refer to or signify.

This gradual shift from Lockean-supported ideologies to Hobbesian cherished ones comes to its zenith when Johnson writes in the same sermons "There are indeed distempers, which no caution can secure us from, and which appear to be more immediately the strokes of Heaven". (Hagstrom 57) Johnson openly contradicts himself by uttering these remarks concerning the role of Providence in placing 'bad tempers' in people's minds. How can someone make choices freely in life if there are irregular passions placed in him by Providence? Johnson does not try to answer this question but instead tries to show that these tempers are quite insignificant "... But these are not of the most painful or lingering kind, they are the most part acute and violent, and quickly terminate". (Hagstrom 57)

Here Johnson, as mentioned before, again tries to overlook the role of the passions in one's life as if they do not exist, or should be taken for granted, but certainly deep in his heart he could never deny their existence, and the role they have in one's destiny. Therefore, although it was observed that Johnson followed Locke's Cartesianism at a surface level deep within he admitted, or if admitting may seem too extreme, showed an inclination towards accepting the existence of Empirically inspired uncontrollable powers within one's psyche that could take control of his actions.

#### 4. Conclusion

The scientific revolution at the beginning of the seventeenth century helped empiricism gain firm grounds as the dominant line of thought among the intellectuals of that era with John Locke as one of its main proponents against the ancient Aristotelian-inspired Cartesianism. In his works, Locke supported the idea of one gaining knowledge, and experience through his life, and stated that one should always stay within the frames of his understanding limits, and should not endeavour to try to understand things that do not fit in that frame.

When it came to the way the human mind functions, Locke did not apply empirically inspired theories which believed the mind could not escape the effects of past-gained knowledge and experience upon its decision-making process. Instead, he followed the Cartesian doctrine announcing that the mind is logical and rational in essence, and will always make the right choice freely without being affected by other factors. So in this way, Locke revealed himself to be a firm supporter of Liberty in human conduct. This attitude also affected Johnson's mindset turning him into a supporter of Libertarianism.

But although Johnson followed Locke in his support of the Libertarian point of view, there was evidence in his works which demonstrated that he did not completely agree with Locke on the rationality of the mind, and freedom of one's will. Johnson's concept of the 'invisible riot of the mind', and the role he ascribed to passions, and chance in

human destiny are among the clues which show that Johnson did not believe in the freedom of the mind completely. The reason can be searched in the scientific discoveries of his age. During this scientific quest, every new discovery revealed a new dimension of the Necessitarian nature of things happening around us, and the way the human mind worked was not an exception. These scientific movements with their necessitarian consequences, along with some philosophers echoing these thoughts in their works caused cracks in Johnson's firm beliefs in libertarianism and gave way to some doubts and inner conflict in him concerning the absolute righteousness of reason as it was supported by Locke.

Johnson demonstrated these inner conflicts in his periodical essays. In the periodical essays, one could see Johnson's inner struggle, and natural tendency to prioritize reason over passions, which can be interpreted as the prioritization of Liberty over Necessity. But one could also observe the inner conflict in Johnson, and the doubt which was hovering over his apparent belief in the superiority of reason over passions. As the essays progress in numbers and issues, Johnson demonstrates a tendency to side more with passions rather than reason and the realization that not everything people do is dictated by reason, and in fact, passions play a more crucial role in controlling human behaviour rather than reason.

Johnson follows the same path in his Sermons. In numerous instances shown from the Sermons, he argues for the superiority of reason but does not deny the existence of forces which would take control of human reason pushing it in their desired direction. He also adds the role of the Providence to his discussions, as these sermons were written to be preached to the congregations.

In general, it can be said that Johnson followed Locke in his basic understanding of how the human mind functions based on a divinely bestowed independent reason, but deep in his heart believed in the existence of unknown forces which could overcome reason, and take control of the human mind. Johnson's genius in raising the topic and introducing the concepts such as the 'invisible riot of the mind', and the existence of dark areas in one's mind that can take control of his behavioural patterns not only brought more awareness of the existence of such hidden mental forces to his contemporaries but also opened the way for future scholars like the psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1886-1939) to develop it further and introduce the concepts of the conscious and the unconscious side of the human psyche.

## Notes

1. Alexander Pope introduces the concept of the ruling passion in the second epistle of the *Essay on Man*. He proposes that everyone is born with an innate dominant passion which affects one's behaviour, and thoughts throughout his life.
2. Hard Determinism supports the idea that man has no authority over his will or destiny, and his destiny is determined from the moment of his birth. It rejects free will completely.
3. In *Rambler* 103 Johnson reasons that some negligence in human conduct is caused by a 'predominant passion'. In *rambler* 104 he discusses how passions take control of the human psyche in certain situations.

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