



Materialism and Determinism in British Post-Renaissance Philosophy: John Dryden's the State of Innocence and the Conquest of Granada through the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes

Harmik Badali Melkonians

Ph.D candidate, University of Tehran

Corresponding Author: Harmik Badali Melkonians

E-mail: harmik.melkonians@ut.ac.ir

Article Citation: Melkonians H. B. (2022). Materialism and Determinism in British Post-Renaissance Philosophy: John Dryden's the State of Innocence and the Conquest of Granada through the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, *Journal of English Literature and Cultural Studies*, 3 (2): 1–13.

Received Date: June 14, 2022


Accepted Date: August 1, 2022

Online Date: September 18, 2022

Publisher: Kare Publishing

© 2022 Journal of English Literature and Cultural Studies

E-ISSN: 2667-6214



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons, Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

ABSTRACT

The cultural, religious, and political changes caused by the Renaissance in England opened the ground for non-conformist, materialistic philosophies to resurface after decades of religious suppression and gain a voice. Thomas Hobbes was one of the leading materialist philosophers of the seventeenth century who used the post-Renaissance created secular atmosphere to introduce himself as a materialistic philosopher. His presented philosophy gained support among contemporary thinkers and was welcomed by the intellectual circles of the Restoration era, introducing him as a strong supporter of determinism and materialism. He believed in the principle of cause and effect in every phenomenon and rejected the idea of free will in human conduct. Dryden too believed in the idea of the angelic and demonic side of human beings and expressed the concepts of fate, fortune, and chance, through his characters in his heroic plays, and fables. The characters in Dryden's plays confess the inescapability of their fates and destiny and question the role of the Providence in their lives. The present article attempts to investigate the correlation between the philosophy of determinism adhered by Thomas Hobbes, and its effects on the major works and thoughts of John Dryden.

Keywords: Free will, Restoration, fate, destiny, Providence.

Introduction

The question of whether one is in control of his destiny, or it is determined by ungovernable forces has always been intriguing for humanity, and the subject of philosophical discussions through different historical epochs from Hellenistic traditions until contemporary times. The first traces of a discussion on human will in the West goes back to the pre-Socratic era. The pre-Socratic accounts of man's fate were explored in gods and the human limit of freedom 1. There was a strong fatalism hovering over humans based on the gods' foreknowledge of future events. Based on the idea that god's foreknowledge is not compatible with human freedom the thinkers of that period did their best not to annoy the gods. Homer's Iliad and Odyssey are distinguished examples of the gods determining the fates of the people.

In Homer's Iliad, the gods' assembly in Mount Olympus sealed the fates of the warriors in Troy on who to survive, and who to be exiled to the underworld. The ancient Greeks gradually started to discover natural and mathematical laws, besides the will of the gods, that governed nature. The discovery of mathematical laws by ancient Greek philosophers such as Pythagoras (570-490 BC) or Archimedes (287-212 BC) revealed that human destiny was mostly dependent on intentional actions and physical laws rather than the divine will of some omnipotent gods 2. However, the appearance of Christianity altered these views dramatically directing them toward a single omnipotent God.

When Christianity became the dominant, and official religion in Europe the ancient pagan gods were replaced with one single almighty God who associated human will with his will. The Bible has numerous passages about man succumbing to the will of God, and God warning people of the consequences of disobeying his will³. So it comes with no surprise that there are no real discussions concerning free will in the New Testament. There are however passages in the Bible where Jesus and his disciples follow the will of God in their pursuits. In a very famous prayer at the Gethsemane Garden Jesus asks God to take death from him but finally subjects himself to the will of God (Mark14:36, Matt 26:39 Luke22:42), elsewhere Paul writes “will of the body leads to death while the will of the spirit leads to life and peace” (Rom 8:6). These words inspired some Christian thinkers like Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD) to discuss free will in Christianity thought to be missing in the Bible⁴. Other Christian thinkers, however, considered God omnipotent, perfect, free, and faultless, therefore found the obeying of his commands enough for salvation, and considered thinking about whether one is free in his actions or not unnecessary. At the dawn of the middle ages, the latter ideology took the ground for itself and silenced the former one.

During the middle ages with the domination of the heavenly and ecclesiastical doctrines, the Will of God was accounted responsible for the fate of humanity and there was a consensus that the fate of individuals was predetermined by themselves. The traditional Christian doctrine maintained that humans were bestowed innate wisdom by the almighty God to choose their path during their lifetimes, and their destiny depended on which path they chose to take. People were free to follow the path of redemption and welcome the angelic side of salvation, or follow the demonic self and descent toward the pit of damnation. Man is free in his choices, and this means he has complete free will to build his destiny of either salvation or damnation. But no matter how strong that ideology was cherished and practised during the middle ages, it went through radical changes during the Renaissance. Its basis crumbled dramatically by the late fifteenth century when political changes swarmed through England leading to the introduction of Humanism into the English philosophical sphere. The rediscovery of classical knowledge, followed by the Renaissance, and the introduction of new sciences also greatly impacted the thought of whether one is in complete control of his destiny or is a victim of his fate.

Up to the Renaissance, religious doctrines, mainly those of Christianity were the main criteria for determining human destiny on this Earth. However, with the introduction of the Renaissance and humanism, some philosophers used the opportunity, provided for them by the marginalization of religion and the demise of ecclesiastical power, to seriously question the ecclesiastical basis of an omniscient power providing mankind with enough knowledge to control his destiny while at the same time undermining human passions, feelings, and instincts. Thomas Hobbes was one of the philosophes who followed this newly introduced doctrine and introduced fresh notions to the question of free will and determinism in human conduct, which left its traces on the literary works of that era.

Discussion

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) is considered one of the pioneers of philosophy in general, and political philosophy in particular in the post-Renaissance period. His introduced doctrine on necessity was quite new and broke the taboo of the discussion around materialistic philosophies on one side and paved the way for other philosophers like Hume, who shared somehow similar thoughts with Hobbes, to continue the argument in the future eras. He also influenced literary figures like John Dryden, especially in his discussion on human fate and passions which will be discussed later in this article.

He was born on 5 April 1588. His hometown was Malmesbury, which is in Wiltshire, England, about 30 miles east of Bristol. Very little is known about Hobbes's mother. His father, also called Thomas Hobbes, was a somewhat disreputable local clergyman. Hobbes left Malmesbury (in 1602 or 1603) to study at Magdalene Hall, Oxford. After graduating from Oxford in February 1608, he went to work for the Cavendish family, initially as a tutor to William Cavendish (1590–1628), who later became the second earl of Devonshire. Hobbes would work for the same family for most of the rest of his life. His work for the Cavendish family is part of what allowed Hobbes to think and write as he did: it gave him access to books and connections to other philosophers and scientists.

Hobbes was a Royalist, and when Charles I first was defeated by the parliamentarians he had to flee to Paris out of fear for his life and spend eleven years there in exile not returning until 1651. During this period in exile, he began his famous argument with Bishop Bramhall concerning the issue of free will and determinism in human conduct. This debate will be used as the main source of Hobbes's argument on determinism in the present article.

Hobbes was probably the first British philosopher to develop a natural philosophy that included a mechanical theory of material qualities against the scholastic theory. According to Bredvold Hobbes's philosophical awakening came at the age of forty:

“His philosophical awakening came at the age of forty, when he accidentally opened a book of Euclid and became enchanted by the certainty of mathematical demonstration. Along with Euclid, he studied Galileo, from whom, it appears, he derived his fundamental mechanical theory, which he proceeded to apply both to the world and to man” (Bredvold, 421)

This is an indication of the influence of the new sciences on Hobbes, and how his developed philosophy was in contrast to both Aristotelianism and Cartesianism in its radical materialistic nature. Where Cartesianism made a distinction between the material and non-material qualities of the body, which in other words meant putting a distinction between the mind and the matter. Hobbes, on the other hand, recognized the mind as a sensory apparatus to transmit the motions necessary to the body through the human nervous system. For Hobbes, humans are not merely more than complex machines, and there is no room for any mind and cognition of humans in his philosophy. While Cartesianism insisted upon ascribing the cognitive, and intellectual abilities to the immaterial mental faculties, Hobbes took it upon himself to argue and prove that all these abilities could be understood within the confines of materialism. Hobbes also had a materialistic view of the soul:

“To complete his scheme, Hobbes insisted that the soul is material, a sort of thin, filmy substance, which could thus be assumed to be a part of the mechanical world” (Bredvold, 421)

Many other critics have also written about Thomas Hobbes, his materialistic views, and his belief in determinism, but to have a first-hand understanding of Hobbes, it would be best to refer to his works as a first-hand source. Hobbes began his famous debate with Bishop John Bramhall (1594-1663) bishop of Armagh, an apologist and an Anglican theologian in 1645 while still in exile. The debate was conducted through exchanging letters between Hobbes, and the Bishop and was published in London under the title *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury Volume Five* in 1841.

It seems that apart from agreeing on the nature of freedom of action, Hobbes and Bramhall disagreed almost about every issue involving the will. The main reason was the two antagonistic thoughts these two thinkers belonged to. While Bishop Bramhall followed the scholastic view of knowledge emerging from one's non-material faculties, Hobbes followed the anti-scholastic mechanistic science where the explanation of a natural phenomenon is not based on the knowledge of the substantial forms, but rather on the knowledge of the size, shape, hardness and other materialistic qualities of substances.

There was a general argument among the determinists against the libertarian claims on the existence of events without any causes, and Hobbes made the same charge against Bishop Bramhall. Bramhall argued that there are enough motives for someone to make a choice, but whether the choice is made or not completely depends on one's own will, while Hobbes on the contrary argued when there are causes for an event they necessitate the choices made by someone based on the effects the causes would produce. Bramhall claimed if there is any necessity it is a kind of 'moral necessity' meaning someone took a certain action because it was necessitated by principles of morality for higher deeds, while Hobbes rejected this idea arguing whatever one does stems from a 'genuine necessity' instead, and argued that necessity took away the freedom of choice and acts otherwise than in line with one's motives. What we call 'will' is the motive that immediately precedes our actions.

Hobbes made use of a newly discovered element against the arguments made by the Bishop, and that was the rhetoric used in the mechanistic science of motion. He argued every movement of the mind is similar to the movement of the body, and it is affected by a certain cause, and the Bishop has no authority to discuss this subject matter as he is no expert in this field and all his knowledge comes from the scriptures rather than the study of science.

At the beginning of the argument, Bishop Bramhall states the question in general which is the subject matter of this dispute. In his own words:

“Whether all events, natural, civil, moral, (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question), be predetermined extrinsically and inevitably, without their concurrence; so as all the actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise after any other manner or in any other end than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or concourse of extrinsical causes, determining them to one” (Molesworth, P. 3).

Hobbes begins his criticism of the Bishop from this very definition. The first issue is that the Bishop has presented the problem in a way that is to his advantage, and has excluded the “conversion of a sinner” from it. Hobbes argues that if this exclusion by the Bishop means the conversion of a sinner is predetermined, then he and the Bishop do not disagree on determinism. If he means otherwise, Hobbes confesses not understanding exactly what the Bishop means. Then he brings the example of appetite to clarify this approach to the question. When someone is hungry he has a will whether to eat or refrain from eating, but can anyone will whether to possess an appetite or not. He agrees with the Bishop in the first part of the argument that one can choose whether to do something or refrain from doing it. In this case, eating. But in the meantime, he disagrees with Bishop on one's having control over his will.

Hobbes then brings examples from the Scriptures, against all the examples put forth by the Bishop to prove that people were free in their choices and that God has decided the destiny of his people. First, he brings an example from the story of Joseph: “Joseph saith to his brethren that had sold him, Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves, that ye sold me hither: for God did send me before you to preserve life” (Gen. xiv,5), or the story of Moses where God said of Pharaoh: “I will harden Pharaoh's heart” (Exod. Vii.3).

But Hobbes does not limit himself to the Old Testament for his examples of God's will in human destiny. He also brings examples from the New Testament. Thus from Jesus, he says:

"And our Saviour saith, (John vi. 44): *No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him*" (Molesworth 7). (Italics by the original author)

Or he exemplifies St. Peter as:

"And St. Peter, concerning the delivering of Christ to the Jews, saith thus, (Acts ii. 23): *Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, &c*". (Molesworth 7) (Italics by the original author)

Hobbes, however, does not limit himself to examples where God had placed negative characteristics in his creations on purpose but argues about instances where God has also placed grace in his created people:

"To these places may be added all the places that make God the giver of all graces, that is to say, of all good habits and inclinations." (Molesworth 9)

While the Bishop believed God has laid the table of good and bad characteristics in front of us, and we are to choose from them upon our will, Hobbes, on the other hand, believes God has given some characteristics to his every creation, and there is no escape from it.

"For by all these it is manifest, that although a man may live holily if he will, yet to will is the work of God, and not eligible by man" (Molesworth 9)

For the Bishop's argument that God is the cause of all motion or whatever happens is the will of God but in the meantime, man is free to choose whether to follow the path of redemption or damnation upon his own will which represents the general view of Christianity towards human will, Hobbes analyses the story of Joseph as narrated in the Old Testament. He begins by quoting Joseph regarding his selling to Egyptians: "It was not you that sent me hither, but God..." (Genesis 45: 1-15). Now if the selling was done by the foreknowledge of God, then how could Jacob have had the power to conduct the act of selling the most beloved son of his free will or refrain from doing it. Here Hobbes considers the will of God, unlike the Bishop, as a necessitarian approach rather than providing an opportunity to choose between several options. Finally, Hobbes leaves the final judgment on whether the human will spring from God's will and foreknowledge of human actions, or man's own free will to the readers:

"For the present, the actions which he thinketh proceed from liberty of will, must either be necessitated, or proceed from fortune, without thinking on what he willet. But it is in no man's election what he shall at any named time hereafter think on. And this I take to be enough to clear the understanding of the reader, that he may be the better able to judge of the following disputation". (Molesworth 19)

In the next sections of their argument, Hobbes moves away from the religious discussions, and in response to the raising of the notion of spontaneous actions by the Bishop, and the fact that the Bishop believed spontaneous actions spring from the immediate decision of one's will without any precedence Hobbes, as a diehard supporter of empiricism, argues that the Bishop's belief is based on his, and his predecessors' ignorance or refusal to accept the credibility of the 'New Sciences'. These new sciences openly proved that behind any effect there is a cause and that no action can take place without precedence. As a proof Hobbes argues while the Bishop considers the falling of the objects as a spontaneous action, he believes there must be cause for it:

"I say, not those actions which had no cause; for all actions have their causes; but those actions whose causes they did not perceive. So that spontaneous, as a general name, comprehended many actions and motions of inanimate creatures; as the falling of heavy things downwards, which they thought spontaneous, and that if they were not hindered, they would descend of their own accord" (Molesworth 93).

Here it should be noted that when Hobbes wrote these arguments in 1645 the Law of Gravity had not been yet discovered by Sir Isaac Newton (Isaac Newton published a comprehensive theory of gravity in 1687). But again due to the scientific fervour prevailing at that time, Hobbes would not accept that even falling of 'heavy things downward' was a spontaneous action and certainly there was a cause for it.

As a final touch on Hobbes perhaps it would be worth learning about Hobbes's views on the role of reason and passions in the human will and conduct. As a follower of Empiricism Hobbes expressed scepticism on the attempts of his predecessors to establish definitive criteria concerning virtue and vice, and as a determinist, he found reason to be a slave of one's passions. As a materialist, Hobbes considered our mental activities as a part of our mechanical system, and nothing more than that. He also believed all our cognition is based on our previous experiences, and the decisions made by one's will are not spontaneous but stem from past causes and experiences. These thoughts of Hobbes alongside the arguments earlier discussed in this article left their mark on Dryden and his works which will be the next subject of study in the present article.

John Dryden (1631-1700) was an English poet, literary critic, translator, and playwright. He largely dominated the literary world of Restoration England and became England's first Poet Laureate in 1668. Dryden was influenced by the philosophical debates of his day, and these debates were echoed in his works. They were especially reflected in the role of Providence, fate and fortune in one's destiny.

Dryden was influenced by two of the revolutionary ideologies of his time. The first one was the fervour with which the discoveries in different fields of science had started, and the second one was the philosophical discussions

around controversial subjects. The new approach to science established a branch in experimental science which came to be known as New Sciences, and the philosophies of free will and determinism were examples of novel philosophical ideas introduced in that period. Both were very novel and revolutionary for that period in history.

One can see Dryden's enthusiasm, and appreciation of the scientific discoveries of his time in the apostrophe to the Royal Society in '*Annus Mirabilis*' (1667), where he praises the advancement in sciences as:

This I fore-tell, from your auspicious care
Who great in search of God and nature grow;
Who best your wise Creator's praise declare,
Since best to praise His works is best to know. (165, 657-60)

Another instance of Dryden's interest and appreciation of the new sciences can be seen in *Essay of Dramatic Poesy* (1668), which is a recognition of scientific advancement after Polish astronomer Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543):

"Is it not evident [asks Crites, who is otherwise on the side of the Ancients] in these last hundred years (when the study of philosophy has been the business of all the Virtuosi in Christendom), that almost a new Nature has been revealed to us?-that more errors of the school have been detected, more useful experiments in philosophy have been made, more noble secrets in optics, medicine, anatomy, astronomy, discovered, than in all those credulous and doting ages from Aristotle to us?-so true it is, that nothing spreads more fast than science, when rightly and generally cultivated" (Works, Vol XVII, 1971, p. 15)

Besides his interest in the new sciences, Dryden was also interested and influenced by the philosophical debates of his day, and these debates were echoed in his works, especially the debate between Bishop Bramhall and Hobbes, and the role of Providence and fortune in one's destiny. Bredvold quotes John Aubrey (1626-1697) in his book *Brief Lives* as saying:

"A valuable clue is given us in the notes collected in 1679-80 by John Aubrey toward a life of Hobbes: 'Mr. John Dreyden, Poet Laureate, is his great admirer, and oftentimes makes use of his doctrine in his plays-from Mr. Dreyden himselfe'. And although Aubrey was too enthusiastic a friend of Hobbes to be trusted in all matters, yet this note can be hardly be without foundation. Its authoritative source is confirmed by the many parallels to the doctrines of Hobbes to be found in Dryden's plays" (Bredvold 43, Aubrey, *Brief Lives*, I, 372)

The provided evidence illustrates Dryden's interest in the new sciences, which was also cherished by Hobbes, and can depict Dryden's interest in Hobbes's philosophical ideas. However, to demonstrate the influence of these ideas on Dryden's works in more detail his written opera entitled '*The State of Innocence*', and the heroic play '*The Conquest of Granada*' will be studied and analysed further in this article.

Dryden wrote *The State of Innocence* in 1673, originally intended to be acted as an opera, although never performed. It is a rhymed adaption of John Milton's epic poem '*Paradise Lost*' (1667) and retells the Biblical story of the fall of man. Although an adaptation of Milton's *Paradise Lost*, Dryden's intended opera is much different from Milton's masterpiece. Milton wrote *Paradise Lost* when Puritanism was at its height in England, but by the time Dryden composed his epic poem a lot of changes had occurred in the political and philosophical spheres of England, and England was going through the monarchical restoration process. The differences are quite notable when, along with all the other scenes, the angels Raphael and Gabriel descend from heaven to warn Adam about sneaking in of a stranger who has set its aim to prepare the grounds for their downfall.

When God expels Lucifer and his entourage who had rebelled against the Providence from Heaven Lucifer vows to take revenge on God by destroying the innocence of Adam and Eve. He finds Adam and Eve sound asleep and he says:

Lucifer. So, now they lie, secure in love, and sleep
Their fated senses in full Draughts of sleep,
By What sure means can I their Bliss invade?
By Violence? No, for they're immortal made,
Their Reason sleeps, but Mimic Fancy wakes;
Supplies her parts, and wild Idea's takes
From words and Things ill-forted and mis-joyn'd:
The Anarchy of Thought and Chaos of the Mind:
Hence Dreams confus'd and various may arise;
These will I set before the Woman's Eyes;
The weaker she, and made my easier Prey;
Vain Shows and Pomp the softer Sex betray. (State of Innocence, p. 16)

Now let us compare this passage with the Miltonic version of the same incident when Eve wakes up from her dream and relates it to Adam, and Adam in return explains the psychology of dream work:

Know that in the soul
Are many lesser faculties that serve

Reason as chief; among these fancy next
 Her office holds; of external things,
 Which the five watchful senses represent,
 She forms imaginations, airy shapes,
 Which reason joining or disjoining, frames
 All what we affirm or what deny, and call
 Our knowledge or opinion; then retires
 Into her private cell when nature rests.
 Oft in her absence mimic fancy wakes
 To imitate her; but misjoining shapes,
 Wild work produces oft, and most in dreams,
 Ill matching words and deeds long past or late.
 Some such resemblances methinks I find
 Of our last evening's talk, in this thy dream,
 But with addition strange; yet be not sad. (Paradise Lost, V, 100-16)

The difference between Milton's Adam and Dryden's Lucifer in their interpretation of the effect of the dream, and the role of reason is a depiction of the difference between the way the two writers understand these notions, and it is a direct effect of the times they lived in. While both use 'mimic fancy' for dreams, which of course Dryden borrowed the term from Milton, the way Adam consoles Eve on the dominance of reason, and its final victory over her fancies, and that there is nothing to worry about is completely different from the interpretation of Dryden's Lucifer about the same idea. Dryden's interpretation of the role of the passions in one's psyche, and its dominance, while one is sleeping, is a direct influence of Hobbes's ideology of reason being a slave of passions. Milton's interpretation of reason, however, as the overall commander of the soul, but relinquishing its command to passions temporarily has its roots in Milton's belief in Scholasticism and Aristotelianism. Hobbesian influence on Dryden becomes more apparent when angels Raphael and Gabriel descend from the heavens to warn Adam of the potential threat which might initiate their downfall.

When angels learn of Lucifer's presence in heaven, and his sinister plans they descend to heaven where Adam and Eve abode. Dryden describes the scene as "The cloud descends with six angels in it; and when 'tis near the Ground, breaks; and on each side, discovers six more; They descend out of the Cloud. Raphael and Gabriel discourse with Adam, the rest stand at distance" (p. 19). Raphael breaks the silence by retelling Lucifer's whispering in Eve's ear and warns Adam that an 'Apostate Angel' seeks their downfall, and has whispered 'Delusive dreams' into Eve's ear warning Adam to take caution on it. Gabriel completes Raphael's remarks by reminding Adam that his reason should take control of the situation "These. As thy Guards from outward Harms, are sent Ills from within, they Reason must prevent" (p.19). Raphael then adds that Adam should praise the one who has created him in his design, and has bestowed him "God-like form'd thee free with Will unbounded as Deity; who gave thee Reason, as thy Aid to chuse Apparent Good, and Evil to refuse". (p. 19). Adam asks in what sense can his praise be meaningful if he is protected and instructed in obedience, which makes his prayer subservient rather than voluntary. It is this question that provokes the long unresolved debate between Adam and the angels. This scene can be considered the most powerful scene in the opera, and it is where Dryden's Adaptation of Milton becomes most complex, as Milton would never imagine his Adam engaging in such debates with the archangels.

After this question, Adam, perhaps to the surprise of Raphael and Gabriel, replies and shows his surprise at their remarks by saying:

Adam: Freedom of Will, of all good things is best:
 But can it be by finite Man Possest?
 I know not how Heav'n can communicate
 What equals Man to his Creator's State" (p.20)

Here Adam shows doubts on how a 'finite man' can possess free will as that would make his state equal to his Creator's. To this Raphael replies that God does not give his power away, but man has freedom in his choices as long as he obeys the 'first Mover', which here is a reference to the first cause argued by theologians. God sets the rules, and man has freedom within the boundaries of those rules.

Indeed, this argument and the one which will be discussed later in this article would remind one of the disputes between Bishop Bramhall, and Hobbes. Hobbes in his dispute with bishop Bramhall in reply to comments made by the Bishop concerning God, his foreknowledge comments:

".... I answer whereunto I said, that all the things now existent, were necessary to the production of the effect to come, that the Fore Knowledge of God causeth nothing though the Will do; that the influence of the Stars is but a small part of that cause which maketh the Necessity; and that this consequence If the concurrence of all the causes necessitate the effect, then Adam had no true liberty, was false. But in his words, if those do take away true liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty, the consequence is good;

but then I deny that Necessity takes away liberty; the reason whereof which is this, Liberty is to choose what we will, not to choose our Will, no inculcation is sufficient to make the Bishop take notice of, notwithstanding he be elsewhere so witty, and here so crafty, as to send out arguments for spies" (Molesworth 112)

This paragraph reveals both how Hobbes's arguments could influence Dryden's reading and adaptation of *Paradise Lost* and the similarity between Hobbes's views and that of Dryden's angels on necessary causes and the human will.

Dryden most probably had that dispute in mind when writing these lines, and the debate between Adam and the angels parallels the exchange over the nature of freewill between Hobbes and the Bishop, like the below instance from the Opera.

Adam replies to Raphael's remarks on the 'first cause' as:

Adam: Grant Heav'n could once have giv'n us liberty;
Are we not bounded, now by firm Decree,
Since whatsoever is pre-ordain'd, must be?
Else Heav'n, for Man, events pre-ordain,
And Man's free-will might make those Ordains vain. (p. 20)

In this instance, Adam, like Hobbes, is questioning Heaven's bestowed liberty based on God's foreknowledge of things to come. If everything is determined by the heavens, then what is the meaning of free will in human conduct. This utterance is quite extraordinary for its time, and if compared with Milton's, and its biblical version it can depict a quite rebellious Adam, like Hobbes, who is questioning all theologically cherished principles of his time regarding the will of God.

In reply, Gabriel says that when God created this world he placed an order that other creations are to obey out of necessity, as nature would dictate them so, and man is not an exception to this rule. To this Adam replies "Yet causes their Effects necessitate, In willing agents; Where is freedom then?" (p.20). This can be quite shocking for the angels, as they have come to warn Adam, and Adam in return, instead of showing complete obedience, has entered a dispute with them concerning human freedom against divine Providence. Adam continues "... who can break the Chain which limits Men To act what is unchangeably forecast Since the first cause gives motion to the last" (p.20). Adam here, like Hobbes, argues that if Eve and he are predestined to fall, then all their efforts to save their souls would be in vain.

Raphael takes turns to answer instead of Gabriel this time, perhaps because he finds Gabriel unable to convince Adam of the righteousness of the Providence on this issue. Like Bramhall, Raphael justifies God's foreknowledge by arguing that God has a foreknowledge of things to come, but does not necessitate them. As he says "Thus thou art not constrain'd to Good or Ill, Causes which work th'Effect, force not the Will" (p.20). Raphael then elaborates on the distinction between God's inference of what must be, and the bringing about of events. He points out that there are first and second causes, and free will exists within the realm of second causes, the realm that Adam understands. God's foreknowledge pertains to the realm of first causes, which is beyond Adam's understanding and does not interfere with free will.

These remarks and justifications not only fail to convince Dryden's created Hobbes like Adam but on the opposite adds to his bewilderment upon the question of the relationship between God's will vs. Man's will. Adam agrees perhaps with Raphael that God has placed rules, and does not intervene with one's affairs, but as Adam confesses 'But the long chain makes not the Bondage less'. He may feel an apparent feeling of freedom but does not feel it deep in the bottom of his heart. He feels to possess the ability to choose but in so doing wills the inevitable. The choices one makes to love, or hate, obey or disobey, have been placed by God into men, so even in one's choices, one has to choose what has been placed in him by the Creator.

Next Gabriel warns Adam to free his mind from such thoughts, and 'impious fancies' as they have no place in heaven, and might lead one to sin. Which Adam replies:

Adam: Far, far from me be banish'd such a Thought:
I argue to be better taught.
Can there be Freedom, when what now seems free
Was founded on some first Necessity?
For whate'er Cause can move the Will t'elect
Must be sufficient to produce th'Effect:
And What's sufficient, must effectual be:
Then how is Man, thus forc'd by Causes, free? (p. 20-21)

Adam's bold statements and questioning of the divine causation structure are a reflection of the questioning spirit of the time. Like Adam, Hobbes also boldly disagreed with the Bishop on the divine foreknowledge as only a knowledge kept by God, and not affecting destinies at the same time. It is difficult to imagine a medieval literary figure describing a scene where instead of humbly listening and obeying the divine orders conveyed through two of heaven's archangels the newly created, naive Adam would question their commands and reasonings and engage in

a dispute with them over God's omnipotence and free will. This change in ideology is the result of the disputes initiated by Philosophers like Hobbes to question the long-cherished principles of divine Providence.

The dispute, however, continues between these three divine and semi-divine creations, and Adam in response to the arguments raised by Raphael and Gabriel concerning heaven's foreknowledge but no intervention policy replies:

Adam: Tho'no constraint from Heaven, or Causes
Heav'n may prevent that Ill he does foresee:
And, not preventing, tho'he does not cause,
He seems to will that Man should break the laws. (p. 21)

Adam wishes to know how heaven has foreknowledge of Adam and Eve sinning, while Gabriel's concern is that Adam's scepticism about free will risks the ascribing the origin of evil to God.

At this point in their dispute, they reach a climactic exchange of ideas in their discussion concerning the origin of evil. Why does not God prevent man from sinning, and by this failing in prevention does he will man to sin? Gabriel replies such intervention from God's side will take away free will. Adam replies God's intervention would be better than letting man sin freely. Raphael responds in that case what would be the meaning of reward and punishment?

Finally, after some arguments, in form of questions and answers, when the archangels fail to convince and satisfy Adam's doubts announce the final decree:

Our task is done, obey, and in that Choice,
Thou shalt be blest, and Angels shall rejoyce. (p.21)

The archangels issue this ultimatum, and final command and ascent to heaven leaving Adam bewildered by their reasonings. Like Hobbes against Bramhall, Adam was not convinced by the reasonings offered by the Braham-like angels, and their justifications created more questions in Adam than answers. With these thoughts in mind, Adam sets off to warn Eve about the plans of Lucifer. He commences his conversation with Eve with a doubtful opening:

Adam: Hard State of Life! Since Heav'n fore-knows my Will,
Why am I not ty'd up from doing Ill?
Why am I trusted with my self at large,
When he's more able to sustain the charge?
Since Angels fell, whose Strength was more than mine,
'Twould show more Grace my Frailty to confine,
Fore-knowing the Success, to leave me free,
Excuses him, and yet supports not me. (p. 21)

Here Adam is left to reflect on his status, and ponder on how hard his condition is, wishing that he were 'ty'd up from doing ill'. The angels have failed to explain the problem of free will to Adam, and he is left hopeless in heaven, faced with choices, ravished with doubts, and waiting to meet Eve. Dryden's Adam is questioning the divine will, and perhaps the original sin itself. If Adam and Eve were predestined to be expelled from heaven, and Heaven had foreknowledge of the events, how were they supposed to be blamed for their misdeeds? These remarks by Adam are very similar to the section of the dispute made between Hobbes and Bramhall earlier discussed in the present article where Hobbes brings examples from the Scriptures showing how God changed the mood of individuals indirectly obliging them to conduct God's will instead of their own.

Dryden's representation of an Adam poisoned with doubts and scepticism reflects the philosophical waves of the age Dryden lived in. It was an age of scepticism, questioning the irrevocable religious, and philosophical basis their ancestors had believed in and fought for it vehemently. Of course, this is not the only work where Dryden questions the divine role in the human will and destiny. In his heroic play, *'The Conquest of Granada'* Dryden engages in a philosophical discussion concerning Fate, fortune, and human will through the characters in the play.

'The Conquest of Granada' (1672) is a heroic play by Dryden written in closed couplets iambic pentameter. The play concerns the battle of Granada, a war between the Moors and the Spaniards which led to the fall of Granada in 1492. The action mainly concerns two factions of Moors, the Abencerrages and the Zegrys, and the Spaniards are mainly kept in the background. The hero is Almanzor, who fights for the Moors. He falls in love with Almahide, who is engaged to Boabdelin, king of the Moors. She loves him, too, but she will not betray her vows to Boabdelin, and Boabdelin is torn between his jealousy and the need for Almanzor. Almanzor and Almahide remain separated until the death of Boabdelin in the last act when impediments are removed and the forbearing lovers can be united. There are two other crossed love plots in the play as well. Abdalla, brother of king Boabdelin, and Abdelmelech, the head of the Abencerrages faction, are in love for the hand of Lyndaraxa, the sister of the leader of the Zegrys. Also, Ozmyrn, a young Abencerrage man, loves Benzayda, a Zegry. During the play, Almanzor is the lost son of the Duke of Arcos, a Spaniard, but he fights for the Moors out of duty.

Dryden begins the play with an Introduction where he discusses the overall plot of the play, and his sources for it. In a particular section of the introduction, he argues the reasons for the superiority of poetry over philosophy. Thus he says:

“This is I say is foundation enough for poetry: and I dare farther affirm that the whole doctrine of separated beings, whether those spirits are incorporated substances, (which Mr. *Hobbs*, with some reason thinks to imply a contradiction,) or that they are a thinner and more Aerial sort of bodies (as some of the Fathers have conjectur’d) may better be explicated by Poets, than by Philosophers or Divines” (Dryden 12)

Although the subject of the discussion is Dryden’s argument on the superiority of poetry over philosophy or religion as a vehicle for transferring ideas does not have much to do with the discussions around the ideas of free will or determinism, but naming Hobbes and using his ideas by Dryden demonstrated Dryden’s familiarity, and perhaps interest in him.

The play was written three years before ‘*The State of Innocence*’, and in this play, Dryden discusses the same issues concerning liberty, and necessity in human conduct from different angles, and perhaps under different headings, but his overall argument much resembles that of *The State of Innocence*. The analysis of the play, however, would be limited to Dryden’s views on the ideas of liberty, necessity, and passions expressed through the characters, and not any other elements of the play.

Fate played a great role in the play. The characters constantly discuss its role in one’s destiny. For example, when the gallant Almanzor wins every battle for Granada and brings victory to it. Abdalla, the ruler of Granada, praises him as “Fate after him, below with pain did move, and Victory could scarce keep pace” (II, i, 26-7). Here in the eye of the king, Almanzor is defying his fate which is falling on the battlefield and returns victorious every time. We will further analyse the role of fate in the destiny of the characters in the play, but now a scene, in the early stages of the play, where passions and fate are intermingled will be studied.

Abdalla, a prince in Granada, has madly fallen in love with Lyndaraxa one of the courtier ladies, and Lyndaraxa has promised to become Abdalla’s wife only if he could overthrow his father, the king, and usurp the throne. After Lyndaraxa leaves Abdalla with this promise Abdalla says:

What did I say!

Father! That impious thought has shock’d my mind:

How bold our passions are, and yet how blind! (II, i, 174-6)

Abdalla has a feeling he has been overpowered with passions, so refers to Zulema, a brother to Lyndaraxa, for council. Abdalla is torn between his virtue and Lyndaraxa’s beauty. On the other hand, Zulema encourages Abdalla to take over the throne and make Lyndaraxa his wife, as it would also benefit him as the brother of the future queen. Therefore, he encourages Abdalla to listen to his heart as a symbol of passion rather than his head as a representative of reason. Abdalla protests by saying ‘Reason was giv’n to curb our headstrong will’ (II, i, 214), To which Zulema replies: Zulema: Reason but shews a weak Physicians skill:

Gives nothing while the raging fit does last;

But staves to cure it when the worst is past. (II, i, 215-6)

Here one gets the impression that Zulema is trying to tempt Abdalla like Lucifer’s temptation of Eve in *The State of Innocence*. Like Eve’s reply to Lucifer on God’s forbidding them from eating the forbidden fruit, Abdalla also admits his fate of not being the firstborn to the king to take the throne naturally “Had fate so pleas’d, I had been eldest born; And then, without a Crime, the Crown had worn” (II, i, 228-9). But under the temptations of Zulema who argues that fates can be altered, and decides to alter his fate “No more; I will usurp the Royal Seat; Thou who hast made me wicked, make me great” (II, i, 236-7). Abdelmelech, by learning about Abdalla’s verdict goes to him to warn Abdalla about the dangers of one trying to alter his fate based on the dictates of his passions.

Abdelmelech advises Abdalla on his passions for Lyndaraxa:

Abdelm: Think, brave Abdalla, what it is you do:

Your Quite, Honour, and our Friendship too,

All for a fickle beauty you forego.

Think, and turn back before it be too late;

Behold, in me th’ example of your fate.

I am your Sea-mark, and though wrack’d and lost,

My Ruins stand to warn you from the Coast” (III, i, 49-55)

Abdelmelech is warning Abdalla over a fate he could not avoid or alter and warns Abdalla about his gloomy fate if he continues his affections for fair Lyndaraxa. As we can see in further examples Dryden always associates fate with bad fortune, and disastrous doom, while fortune with a good future.

Abdalla’s reply to Abdelmelech would comprise one of the most philosophical discussions around the Providence, and its role in human destiny:

Abdal: your Counsels, noble Abdelmelech, move

My reason to accept ‘em; not my love.

Ah, why did heav’n leave Man so weak defence

To trust frail reason with the rule of Sence?

‘Tis over-pois’d and kick’d up in the Air,

While sence weighs down the Scale; and keeps it there. (III, i, 55-61)

Here we see the Hobbesian argument of the reason being the slave of passions. Abdallah confesses Abdelmelech counsel to be reasonable but lacks the power to win over his dominating passion which is love. He also questions heaven's wisdom to leave man so vulnerable, and frail when it comes to controlling his passions, and how passions outweigh reason on the decision-making scale.

Abdelmelech replies to Abdallah:

No, no; our Reason was not vainly lent;
Nor is a slave but by its own consent.
If Reason on his Subjects Triumph wait,
An easie king deserves no better Fate. (III, i, 64-67)

Abdelmelech seems to be taken aback by Abdalla's remarks as he begins his reply with 'No, no...'. This might remind one of the disputes between the newly created Adam, and the archangels in *'The State of Innocence'*. The angels were also a little surprised, like Abdelmelech, by the bold questions Adam asked, and the arguments he put forward. Like Raphael, Abdelmelech tries to convince Abdalla about the falsity of his belief in the supremacy of passions over reason, and that the ability of reason in overpowering passions in all circumstances would direct the will in the proper direction. To which Abdalla replies by confessing that his love for Lyndaraxa has made him lose his mind to passions 'Love like a Lethargy has seized my Will'.

There are instances in the play where Dryden sides with Hobbes on assuming the heavens responsible for the fate of mankind. While the Bishop in his dispute with Hobbes insisted on the assumption that God's knowledge of human fate is merely a foreknowledge, and does not determine the fate of anyone, Hobbes on the other side found it paradoxical and that if God had foreknowledge of the fate of somebody, then certainly his fate was sealed and this made the notion of free will meaningless. As said before it seems in this case Dryden sides with Hobbes.

After a bitter argument where Almanzor accuses Almahide of infidelity, Almahide refers to her maid Esperanza for some council. She wishes she were dead, to which Esperanza replies:

Esper. Madam, you must not to Despair give place;
Heav'n never meant misfortune to that Face.
Suppose there were no justice in your cause,
Beauty's a Bribe that gives her judges Laws.
That you are brought to this deplor'd estate,
Is but th' ingenious Flatt'ry of your Fate: (III, i, 296-301)

Esperanza believes Fate to be responsible for Almahide's most desperate state, but in the meantime believes Almahide can alter this Fate when she says 'Fate fears her Succor like an Alms to give: And would, you, God-like from your self should live' (III, i, 302-3). Almahide should be strong enough to fight against the verdicts of her fate Esperanza says.

At this moment Almanzor enters the room, and a bitter dispute erupts between him and Almahide. Almahide confesses that she has been promised to Boabdelin and that his love for her is futile. Hearing this Almanzor breaks into a rage:

Almanza. Are you belov'd by him? O wretched fate,
First that I love at all; then, love too late! (III, i, 376-7)

To which Almahide replies:

Almah. Alas it is in vain;
Fate for each other did not us ordain.
The chances of this day too clearly show
That Heav'n took care that it should not be so. (III, i, 279-382)

Almahide believes God's decree is unalterable, and Almanzor cannot escape his destiny. This is a reflection of Hobbes's view on determinism which Dryden introduces in the play in form of divine Providence. But Almanzor would not accept Fate's decree.

Almanz. Would Heav'n had quite forgot me this one day,
But Fate's yet hot
I'll make it take a bent another way. (III, i, 383-5)

Almahide states again that she has already vowed to Boabdelin and that their book of fate has been already written. To this Almanzor replies "Good Heav'n thy book of fate before me lay, But to tear out the journal of this day". (III, i, 397-8). This is a reference to the constant dispute between the theologians, and materialistic philosophers like Hobbes. While the theologians believe man has been bestowed enough abilities to take charge of his fate, the materialists argue that man has limited wisdom, is subject to the physical rules placed by the Providence, and is not able to alter it. Here Dryden seems to be siding with materialists rather than the theologians because as it will be observed in more instances in the play the characters lament more on their unalterable fate rather than taking pride in their ability to alter it.

All through the rest of this act, the characters talk about a Fate that cannot be altered, and that everyone should unquestionably accept. There are, however, two instances in the play where characters enter the stage with soliloquies. Dryden seems to be expressing his views through their speeches. The first one is in act four scene two when bewildered Lyndaraxa comes to the stage to lament her futile love life.

Lynd. O could I read the dark decrees of fate,
That I might once know whom to love or hate!
For I my self scarce my own thoughts can gness,
So much I find 'em varied by success.
As in some wether-glass my love I hold;
Which falls or rises with the heat or cold.
I will be constant yet, if Fortune can;
I love the King; let her but name the man. (IV, ii, 71-78)

Lyndaraxa is bewildered by her choice between two suiters but leaves everything to fate and fortune. As previously discussed Dryden associates fate with bad fortune, and fortune with good fate, and here is a good example of hearing that doctrine through the lips of Lyndaraxa.

Lyndaraxa soliloquizes further when she learns about Abdallah's arrest by Almanzor which means she would have to lose all hopes of becoming queen.

Lynd. No; none but I have reason to complain!
So near a kingdom, yet 'tis lost again!
O, how unequally in me were joynd
A creeping fortune, with a soaring mind!
O Lottery of fate! Where still the wise
Draw blanks of Fortune; and fools the prize!
These Cross ill-shuffled lots from Heav'n are sent,
Yet dull Religion teaches us content. (III, ii, 25-32)

This passage is particularly important as again Dryden repeats his doctrine of Fortune being associated with a good future, while fate with the inevitable dark one. Lyndaraxa was about to fall into the bosom of fortune, and become the queen but the 'lottery of fate' caused the last minute overturning of her fortune to ill fate. In the last two lines, Lyndaraxa ascribes all bad fortune to be originating from Heavens. This is a direct reference to Hobbesian divine foreknowledge and predetermined destiny. But then she takes one step further and accuses Religion of teaching one how to be content despite all the ill fate coming toward him from the heavens.

Another instance of a soliloquy is at beginning of the second part of the play when king Ferdinand of Spain talks about the role of fate not only in the destiny of individuals but also in different nations. King Ferdinand argues every nation has infancy, maturity, and a decline resulting in its death, and all these processes are observed and governed by fate. First, an Empire appears on the global map "When Empire in its Childhood first appears, A watchful Fate o'resees its tender years" (Part II, I, i, 5-6). 'Tender years' refers to the first years of any newly established kingdom while it is more vulnerable to various exploitations by other more powerful nations. But fate protects that nation and lets it grow. In time it reaches maturity and becomes all-powerful, but again time seals its fate and makes its destruction inevitable.

When from behind, there starts some petty State;
And pushes on its now unwieldy fate:
Then, down the precipice of time it goes,
And sinks in Minutes, which in Ages rose. (Part II, I, i, 13-6)

Here Dryden elaborates on the role of fate in nations through King Ferdinand. Perhaps Dryden, based on his studies on antiquity, had the Greek civilization or the Roman Empire in mind when he was writing these lines, but the notable point is linking the rise and fall of these Empires to an inevitable fate.

In two other instances in the play, the characters address fate directly for their misfortunes. In act three, scene one when Almanzor hears about the fall of the Vermillion towers in Alhambra castle he says:

Alman. Fate, now come back; thou canst not farther get;
The bounds of thy liberation here are set.
Thou knowest this place,
And, like a Clock wound up, strik'st here for me;
Now, chance assert thy own inconstancy:
And, Fortune, fight, that thou maist Fortune be. (III, i, 191-6)

Almanzor invokes fate to reverse his fortune and show him a kind face as they could win back the towers only with the help of fate in those most desperate hours. He also asks fortune, as a symbol of a good future, to take back its ill verdict and prove that good fortune still exists, and can push back chance which Dryden associates with inconsistency.

In a conversation between Benzayda and Ozmyn, when Benzayda learns about her father's death she says:

Benz. Blind Queen of Chance, to lovers too severe,
 Thou rul'st Mankind, but art a Tyrant here!
 Thy widest Empyre's in a lovers brest:
 Like open Seas we seldom are at rest.
 Upon thy coasts our wealth is daily cast;
 And thou, like Pyrates, mak'st no peace at last. (III, ii, 17-22)

Benzayda addresses fate as the 'blind queen of chance' who is blind and therefore unable to see to which shore of destiny she throws her subjects, but throws randomly by chance. Benzayda laments this, and Dryden again affirms his views on the unpredictability of fate and man's lack of power to either control or alter it despite his wishes to do so.

Conclusion

The religious, historical, and cultural changes that occurred after the Renaissance prepared the intellectual ground for the philosophers who emerged in the seventeen and eighteen centuries to introduce theories on liberty and necessity in human conduct. These theories in return left their marks in the works of the neoclassical writers who were either contemporary of the philosophers or followed them as future generations.

Thomas Hobbes, as one of the first British materialistic philosophers, used the opportunity of the secular atmosphere created in the post Renaissance era to engage himself in a dispute with Bishop Bramhall, which if it had occurred during the middle ages would certainly have ended in his Inquisition. Hobbes believed the passions to be the sole commander of the will and recognized reason as unable to control them. He also assumed reason to be the slave of passions and announced himself a firm believer in determinism.

This Hobbesian ideology can be traced to the works of Dryden. He restated Hobbes's theory through the dialogues of the characters in his works. Adam in *'The State of Innocence'* sides with Hobbes in his dispute with the archangels concerning the role of the Providence in predestination, and His characters in *'The Conquest of Granada'* lament the role of the inescapable fate in sending them to their dooms.

In both works studied in this article Dryden, as can be expected from a literary figure, speaks through his characters. In *'The State of Innocence'*, we observe an Adam that contrary to his biblical, and Miltonic counterparts questions the archangels Raphael and Gabriel's commands by engaging them in an argument concerning free will, and the role of Providence in human destiny. Hobbes's influence can be noticed here when the angels side with Bishop Bramhall in their reasoning for God's justice, and his foreknowledge while providing a choice for man to choose between blessing and damnation. Adam, who does not seem to accept their reasonings, has Hobbes in mind when he discusses God's foreknowledge as a kind of divine determinism. Humans have no escape from it no matter how hard they try to change their destiny.

In *'The Conquest of Granada'* Dryden's characters feel the burden of Fate on their shoulders. Determinism is hovering in the skies of Granada, and no matter how hard the warriors, and lovers try to, or wish to escape their destiny it becomes a futile gesture for them as they face their inescapable doom all the time. This is no doubt an expression of the Hobbesian cherished ideology of necessity or determinism, but Dryden gives it a little twist by associating fate with a bad future, and fortune with a happy future which is beside his belief in this categorizing might have its root in his literary taste.

Notes

1. "...in a second poem, *Works and Days*, Hesiod pays more attention to human beings, telling the story of earlier, greater creatures who died out or were destroyed by themselves or Zeus. Humans were created by Zeus, are under his power, and are subject to his judgment and to divine intervention for either good or ill. Hesiod's world, like Homer's, is one that is god-saturated, where the gods may intervene in all aspects of the world, from the weather to mundane particulars of human life, acting on the ordinary world order, in a way that humans, limited as they are by time, location, and narrow powers of perception, must accept but cannot ultimately understand".
 Curd, Patricia, "Presocratic Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/presocratics/>.
2. "The Presocratics reject this account, instead seeing the world as a *kosmos*, an ordered natural arrangement that is inherently intelligible and not subject to supra-natural intervention". Curd, Patricia, "Presocratic Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/presocratics/>.
3. There are numerous verses in the Bible where God commands people to obey his will. Some of them are: "For this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments; and His commandments are not burdensome" (John 5:3). "But He said, On the contrary, blessed are those who hear the word of God and observe it." (Luke 11:28). "But this is what I commanded them, saying, 'Obey My voice, and I will be your God, and you will be My people; and you will walk in all the way which I command you, that it may be well with you.'" (Jeremiah 7:23).

4. Tornau, Christian, "Saint Augustine", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/augustine/>>.

Reference

- Anstey, Peter R., editor. *The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
- Barbeau, Anne T. *The Intellectual Design of John Dryden's Heroic Plays*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1970.
- Bredvold, L. Louis, *Dryden Hobbes, and the Royal Society*, *Modern Philology*, May 1928, Vol. 25, No 4, p 417-438, University of Chicago Press, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/433266
- Dearing, Vinton A. and Alan Roper, editors. *The Works of John Dryden Volume XIV*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1992.
- Dryden, John. *The State of innocence and Fall of Man*, 2nd edition, 1678.
- Francks, Richard. *Modern Philosophy the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2003.
- Hammond, Paul. *Dryden's Philosophy of Fortune*, *The Modern Language Review*, Oct. 1985, Vol. 80, No.4, Pages 769-785
- Hopkins, David. *John Dryden*, Northcote House Publishers, UK, 2003
- Loftis, John and Stuart Rodes, editors. *The Works of John Dryden Vol XI*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1978
- Molesworth, Sir William, editor. *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Vol. V.*, Bart. London: John Bohn, 1841.
- O'Keefe, Tim, *Ancient Theories of Freedom and Determinism*, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/freedom-ancient>.
- Raymond, Joad. *Milton's Angels the Early-Modern Imagination*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.
- Swedenberg, H. T., editor. Samuel Holt Monk editor, *The Works of John Dryden Prose 1668-1691: An Essay of Dramatic Poesie and shorter Works Vol. XVII*, University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1971.
- Sleigh, R., Chappell, V., & Rocca, M. (2000). *Determinism and human freedom*, In D. Garber & M. Ayers (Eds.), *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-century Philosophy* (pp. 1193-1278). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CHOL9780521572330.007